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Abstract   Assuming the absolute nothingness as the most primitive idea that 
can be imagined; I present a simple way to refer to this absolute, by reducing 
it onto some primitive object. In order to do this more precisely, I have 
reintroduced the required terminology and structures1. The primitive that is 
presented, can be regarded as a minimal formal system that can generate some 
infinite variety of symbols; expressed in terms of the elements and operations 
of the primitive. Provided that some proper modification is applied to this 
system, I suggest a possible application could be, to use it as a pedagogical 
instrument to visualize the idea of integer primality and their representations 
in terms of the primes. 
 
1. MOTIVATION 
The idea of irreducibility or primitive notion in mathematics brings the possibility of 
producing varieties that can be expressed by the original prime elements together with 
some proper operators between the primes. In addition and for other contexts, it is 
plausible to think of the same idea, by which we can generate the multiplicity of the 
context; having a variety of distinct expressions of the primitive notion, in which the 
expressions inherit some sameness and some difference. Moreover, any meaning that 
is implied by these expressions is characterized by the primitive, and not only we can 
generate a multiplicity of varieties containing distinct expressions or symbols; facing 
the possibilities that the primitive provides but also, going in the other direction; we 
can try to trace the symbols back to the primitive. For example, think about prime 
integers and addition; axioms of mathematical logic; the atoms of the chemical 
elements and their chemistry; syllables and syntax of a natural language, and the simple 
vibrations and their frequency which generates an infinity of distinct musical notes. 
These ideas together with the possibilities, sublimely put forward by Kantian 
philosophy of, a priori and intuition; the ground provided by Frege’s principle of 
compositionality, the illustrations of Peano arithmetic, and the landscapes explored by 
                                                          
1 I have abducted this from mathematics; which was then redefined to fit the purpose; most of which is 
found in the appendix and the exceptions are defined in the body of the text. I know very well that many 
mathematicians consider such usages of their discourse a mutiny; but my abduction is restricted to my 
specific purpose, thus angry mathematicians can rest assured; I am not molesting their commandments. 
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Kripke’s reference theory, lead me to investigate the possibility of yet another example 
of a primitive notion, that makes a systemic, differentiation and repetition possible. 
2. THE INFINITE JEST *
2.1. A Leap from Sense into Nonsense
The study of the absolute nothingness3 is well beyond our scope; we just want it as a 
reference point and the idea is to find a way to refer to it by any means possible. 
Nonetheless, by the definition4, this should be impossible if we are to completely 
preserve the absolute nothingness; thus we should preserve parts and dismiss the rest. 
In this case, the variation or the object generated by the reference should have a nonzero 
divergence relative to the absolute nothingness. Said differently, any reference to this 
absolute nothingness will inevitably mutilate it. Now, as we deviate from the absolute 
into the reduced primitive object; we want every possible variety of this primitive object 
to be generated by expressions in terms of the constituent parts of the primitive; which 
the rules for any such expression, is initially implied by the primitive; further, we want 
the possibility of generating some infinite variety from this primitive object, think about 
it as partially preserving the infinity5 of the absolute. Now we shall construct this 
primitive object; that is, in a nutshell; a projection of the nothingness, externalized and 
reduced into a bundle6. 
2.1.1. Sense 
In set theory, something close to this absolute nothingness, or more precisely to the 
primitive object we want to construct, is the idea of the empty set; a set of no elements. 
Not surprisingly, the empty set is a set and the easiest way to think about a set, is to 
regard it as a notion, which implies the idea of containing some proper elements or 
nothing at all. Now in the empty set, we restrict ourselves to the bare and hollow idea 
with no elements; i.e., a set that is just a set; which every other set is this bared idea 
that is further specified by some elements that fill the emptiness within. 
* Snatched from the title of a 1996 novel by David Foster Wallace. 
3 Further description of the italicized terms is found in the appendix; or in the boldfaced terms, shortly 
following the italicized ones. 
4 See the appendix. 
5 Or in a sense, the invariance. 
6 In (Hegel, 1977, p. 578) we have “Spirit at first has the consciousness of itself as being all truth and all 
reality in the form of a mere concept, a dark night of essence opposed to its daylight forms, a creative secret 
of birth. This secret must be externalized, seen in and through all daylight forms”. Further notice the 
Lacanian concept of point de capiton which is the locus where “the signifier stops the otherwise endless 
movement of the signification … and produces the necessary illusion of a fixed meaning” (Evans, 1996, p. 
151). 
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 Now for 𝑺𝑺 = {} we can think about it as 𝑺𝑺 = 𝑺𝑺, because {} is the bared concept of 
a set and 𝑺𝑺 says, I am another way to state this fact7. Here, the equation implies 
absolute sameness; and representing the empty set {}, also by 𝑺𝑺 is only for notational 
purposes and has no significant of its own; shortly we shall present another way, which 
further distinguishes between this two; and somehow removes the equality sign8. By 
an abuse of notation9, the idea is to extend and distinguish the notion of a set into 
further constituents; that is a name, which implies a label that bundles a notion into a 
labeling for that notion, i.e., the labeling is a characterization of the notion “by 
externalizing it via the label”. Let us forget this gibberish for just a moment; say a 
labeling is the idea of an imagined container or a label that contains the notion (or a 
thing), and the notion somehow prevents this imaginary container from degenerating 
out of existence. Looking at the empty set, such a notion is not explicitly addressable, 
i.e., the label only refers; it proposes a container, yet the thing in reference and the 
contained is missing or hidden in a sense. 
 Now if I say the thing I am trying to label, is also the thing being externalized and 
equal to the name of the envisioned labeling; then this pathological labeling is also the 
characterization of itself; i.e., of the labeling, see 
𝓟𝓟 = {𝓟𝓟}
here we have imagined a label, denoted by the empty set {}, which bundles up 𝓟𝓟 as {𝓟𝓟}; the notion that specifies the label into a labeling is 𝓟𝓟; which is also its given name, 
i.e., 𝓟𝓟 is itself and a reference to itself; on the other hand, 𝓟𝓟 is all the same if it is 
considered without a reference to itself. Said in the other direction; the externalization 
the name implies is that, it contain its own externalization; i.e., there is nothing beyond 
𝓟𝓟 and thus there is no externalization; this name describes itself, in the terms of itself. 
Instead of killing this idea by saying, it is contradictory, or even paradoxical, let us 
imagine for a moment that this pathological and illusive name implies some oscillation 
between expressions; of being itself, being the reference to itself, and being its own 
signification. Clearly this is far from something 10  like 𝑺𝑺 = 𝑺𝑺  because 𝑺𝑺  is just 𝑺𝑺 ; 
nothing more nothing less; yet 𝓟𝓟 is also a description of itself; it distinguishes itself; 
but here, what it distinguishes is not only itself, but itself also, infinitely contains itself 
and refers to itself with no termination11. 
7 For further insights, see (Kripke, 1980, pp. 25, 55, 57, 64-65, 71). 
8 See the weak and the strong notions of truth in (Gupta & Belnap, 1993, p. 22). 
9 My idea will be very similar, almost identical to that of (Frege, 1948); but because of the differences, I 
should start all over and change the terminology to avoid confusion. 
10 See (Žižek, 2012, p. 167). 
11 For more on the well-known paradoxes implied by this idea, see, (Halbach, 2014, p. 25). Further, 
regarding self-referential sentences see (Gupta & Belnap, 1993, p. 96). 
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2.1.2. Leap 
Finally, introducing our own notation we say a name denoted by 𝜦𝜦 implies a tuple as 
follows 𝜦𝜦 ⇒ �𝜇𝜇,𝜒𝜒,𝜒𝜒(𝜇𝜇)� where 𝜇𝜇  is the notion or the defining properties, 𝜒𝜒 is the 
mean to reference or the label operator which taking on 𝜇𝜇, it outputs the labeling, 
𝜒𝜒(𝜇𝜇). Further, whenever it is proper12 we may write 𝜦𝜦 = 𝜒𝜒(𝜇𝜇). 
 Generally, 𝜒𝜒 should specify the rule, which makes this referring possible; e.g., in 
set theory, a set or the empty set, proposes the possibility of including proper elements 
inside; thus enclosing elements inside a set, is such a rule and it is clear that {𝑥𝑥} ≠ 𝑥𝑥. 
So think about it in this way; 𝜒𝜒 characterize (or express) 𝜇𝜇 by an arbitrary rule like {}; 
this is to say, the characterization, rather externalize the notion. Now, because 𝜒𝜒 
propose a distinction, the requirements of such a distinction, dictates there should be 
something to be distinguished from; intuitively speaking; there should be something 
inside or outside the notion; not equal to it; in order to have a proper characterization. 
Now, for our 𝓟𝓟, the name implies “a notion 𝓟𝓟 that is characterized by containing 
itself”; if this is the case; then there is nothing beyond this notion; “nihil ulterius”. Thus, 
distinction is only formally implied or imagined; and any proper distinction is 
impossible and pathological; because the notion is equal to its characterization. 
 Further, if we have only one object; then to properly characterize this object; the 
object itself should have different referable atoms; this is, if 𝜒𝜒 is well-behaved it should 
not redefine the object by the characterization. Considering some arbitrary object, if 𝜒𝜒 
characterize the object by reducing it to some if its atoms, irreversibly; then it is not the 
original object that it is characterized, but some atoms; given by the irreversible 
annihilation of the other atoms; therefore in this case the labeling is pathologically 
defined and further it is false; because we said we are going to characterize a specific 
object, yet we mutilate it, and it became a new object; characterized, and distinguished 
from the original one. 
 To go back to the case of having only, and only one object in our universe; suppose 
this is some primitive object (it has only two atoms); we shall call this setting a 
primordial universe. Our orphan object has nothing outside, but two referable atoms 
inside; if without mutilating the object to any of its two atoms, we are able to 
characterize it; we shall call this characterization a restriction; this is, one of the atoms 
should characterize the other atom which is considered as the notion of the 
characterization; in this case, the externalization is provided by the integrity of the 
object being in its totality. Further, let → denotes such a restriction, and ↪ the release 
from this restriction (or characterization) back to the original state. 
 For illustration, think about a primordial universe, of some special light bulb; 
which is an object that implies the possibility of “being-on”; now the light bulb itself, 
is being neither of the following states; “on”, “off”, “on and off”, “on and not-off”, or 
12 That is to say, when the notion is different from the labeling. Thus, in the example where 𝓟𝓟 = {𝓟𝓟}, we 
do not have this difference and we do not write 𝓟𝓟 = 𝜒𝜒(𝓟𝓟). 
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“not-on and off”; rather it is the object that provides the possibility of “being-on”; so in 
a sense it is being “not-on and not-off”, and the release does not turn off the light; what 
it does is to imply an expression, which is “a becoming, of no longer being characterized 
by being-on”; this characterization implies or expresses the state of the primal 
possibility, of the implication, “to-become-on”. Thus, the “on-state” is not equal to the 
object or the light bulb, neither it is equal to “being-on”; the “on-state” is the 
implication, “to-become characterized by the off-state”. 
 Now let us denote the light bulb by 𝓧𝓧; which has an atom denoted by 𝜈𝜈, and 
another atom, which is a label operator (i.e., it can characterize), denoted by 𝜒𝜒. Let, 𝓧𝓧 
imply 𝜒𝜒(𝜈𝜈), and 1 ≔ 𝜒𝜒(𝜈𝜈), this means, by considering 𝜈𝜈, we produced an expression 
denoted by 1, which is “being-on”. Here we can write 𝓧𝓧 → 1 to denote the whole idea 
of restricting 𝓧𝓧  onto 1 . Now let us say 𝜈𝜈  is defined if 𝜒𝜒(𝜈𝜈) , thus 𝜈𝜈  should be 
considered a falsity, denoted by 𝐅𝐅; intuitively, because as we said 𝜈𝜈 is defined if 𝜒𝜒(𝜈𝜈), 
yet our object, 𝓧𝓧 in its initial setting is “the unfulfilled possibility of 𝜒𝜒(𝜈𝜈)”, thus initially 
there is no such expression 𝜒𝜒(𝜈𝜈). Now, assuming we have 1, we consider 1 as a truth, 
denoted by 𝐓𝐓. At this stage, we can release our restriction, let 1 ↪ 𝓧𝓧 denote this idea; 
now we can write 1 only if 𝓧𝓧; assuming to have 𝜒𝜒(𝜈𝜈) meant in any case, that 𝓧𝓧 was 
the case. Now denote the whole expression 𝜒𝜒(𝜈𝜈) ↪ 𝓧𝓧 by 0, this is to write13, 0 ≔(1 ↪ 𝓧𝓧) which expresses “being-off”; to sum-up, let us write 
o 𝓧𝓧 = {𝜈𝜈,𝜒𝜒 ∶ 𝓧𝓧 ⇒ 𝜒𝜒(𝜈𝜈)}, 
o 1 ≔ 𝜒𝜒(𝜈𝜈) is the expression generated by considering 𝓧𝓧 → 1, in which 1 is a 
“being”, 
o 0 ≔ 1 ↪ 𝓧𝓧 is the expression which is equal to the release of 1 back to 𝓧𝓧; 
thus 0 is a “being” that is defined by a “becoming” for consistency we 
additionally, denote this characterization writing 0 ≔ 𝜒𝜒−(1). 
Now we define further expressions14 and denote them by binary numbers 
     0 ≔ 𝜒𝜒−(1)  ⇒ 𝐅𝐅 
     1 ≔ 𝜒𝜒(𝜈𝜈)  ⇒ 𝐓𝐓 
     10 ≔ 𝜒𝜒(1)  ⇒ 𝐅𝐅 
     11 ≔ 𝜒𝜒(10)  ⇒ 𝐓𝐓 
     100 ≔ 𝜒𝜒(11)  ⇒ 𝐅𝐅 
     …. 
                                                          
13 The parentheses are only to emphasis that 0 is the whole expression, and we shall not use parentheses 
for this purpose, anymore. 
14 Here, one can think about the characterizations (and consequently the implications) as being the 
negation of the argument; thus the consequent implication is true, if and only if, the “ones place” is the 
digit 1. One may also define, for the variety generated as such, a binary operation (e.g., XOR-ing) for every 
symbol of the variety, or even define some bitwise operations; the details should be obvious. Finally, it is 
also plausible to compare this to von Neumann ordinals (for now, ↦ denotes the next symbol), consider 
� � ↦ �� �� ↦ �� �, �� ��� ↦ �� �, �� �� , �� �, �� ���� ↦ ⋯. 
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Using the above construction, now I shall present a model for the desired primitive 
object—which I have further described in the remaining sections—for now, suppose, 
we have a primordial universe of 𝓧𝓧 (similar to the case described above); let 𝑥𝑥 and 
𝑦𝑦   =    𝓧𝓧⊗𝑥𝑥 , be the two constituents atoms. Here, 𝑦𝑦  is the restriction—by the 
quotient-like operator, −⊗−, that is the possibility that is put forward by 𝓧𝓧; the 
quotient can be used to fractionalize every possible numerator (left), in terms of its 
denominator (right); also preserving the numerator by the proper release from the 
restriction, denoted by −△−; a product-like operation that glues back the fractions 
produced—to the original numerator—that is, to multiply the whole fraction by the 
denominator, now let 1 ≔ 𝓧𝓧⊗ 𝑥𝑥 → 𝑦𝑦0 ≔ 𝑦𝑦 △ 𝑥𝑥 ↪ 𝓧𝓧
and, −↷ −  (and −↺ − ) denotes the fractionalization (and defractionalization)—
from left to right—by the means of the quotient (and the product), finally, we write 
𝓧𝓧 = {𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 ∶ 𝓧𝓧 ⇒⊗}
denoting the outcome of the iterations via binary numbers, we generate the following 
sequence of outcomes 
𝓧𝓧 ↷ 1 ↺ 0 ↷ 1 ↷ 10 ↷ 11 ↷ 100 ↷ ⋯
with their decomposition15 as 
𝓧𝓧 ↷ 𝓧𝓧⊗ 𝑥𝑥 → 𝑦𝑦 ≔ 1
↺ 𝑦𝑦 △ 𝑥𝑥 ↪ 𝓧𝓧 ≔ 0
↷ 𝓧𝓧⊗ 𝑥𝑥 → 𝑦𝑦 ≔ 1
↷ 𝓧𝓧⊗ 𝑥𝑥 → 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 △ 𝑥𝑥 ↪ 𝓧𝓧 ≔ 10
↷ 𝓧𝓧⊗ 𝑥𝑥 → 𝑦𝑦𝓧𝓧⊗ 𝑥𝑥 → 𝑦𝑦 ≔ 11
↷ 𝓧𝓧⊗ 𝑥𝑥 → 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 △ 𝑥𝑥 ↪ 𝓧𝓧𝑦𝑦 △ 𝑥𝑥 ↪ 𝓧𝓧 ≔ 100 ↷ ⋯
bearing the same truth values as that of the light bulb described earlier. Note that, for 
example in the decompositions of 10 and 100, the isolated 𝑦𝑦, is nowhere to be found 
and it is mutated into 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦. By this construction, we showed a possibility of generating 
infinite varieties, if we are not to terminate the iteration of the further implied 
characterizations, each of which is considered a symbol of the specific variety generated. 
Before presenting a visual for this idea, it is most convenient, to quote from Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus 
15 In (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 80) we have “The method by which mathematics arrives at its equations is 
the method of substitution . . . equations express the substitutability of two expressions and, starting from 
a number of equations, we advance to new equations by substituting different expressions in accordance 
with the equations”. 
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. . . A picture can depict any reality whose form it has. A spatial picture can depict 
anything spatial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc. . . . A picture cannot, 
however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it. . . . A picture represents its subject 
from a position outside it. (Its standpoint is its representational form.) That is why 
a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly. . . . A picture cannot, 
however, place itself outside its representational form. (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 11). 
In the following figure16, one can see a visualization for the formal decomposition 
described for our primitive object: starting from the square a decomposition could be 
“the big white triangle” attached to the part that implies “the decomposition into 
smaller triangles”, next, “the big white triangle together with the black one” attached 
to the part that implies “the decomposition into smaller triangles”, etc., our inlotus is 
2.1.3. Nonsense 
Once again, consider the original mathematical notation 𝓔𝓔 = {}. In mathematics, this 
is just a definition; a set with no elements, and questions about its nature, is and for 
good reasons, considered nonsense, trivial, and ultimately stupid; the definition is very 
well-behaved and useful; a bless in its own right. Nonetheless, I shall ask some of this 
stupid questions once more; for example, “what is contained inside the labeling?”; this 
what; this thing; this contained notion; maybe is sort of like the following expression; 
sometimes abused to describe the integer zero; that is “the placeholder, for when we 
want to say, we have nothing”; so, for 𝓔𝓔 =  𝜒𝜒(𝜇𝜇), our notion should be something like 
𝜇𝜇 is “not being a thing”; some description for “nothing”; continuing in this line of 
thought, we are just going to circulate some tautological iterations, without mutilating 
this iterations into a signification. Insisting on this point, one last time; let us utter that 
𝓔𝓔 is “a labeling for something that does not accept any definition”; or rather, “the 
emptiness of some false statement”; for example, “the set of all 𝑥𝑥 such that 𝑥𝑥 ≠ 𝑥𝑥”. 
16 Which I call an inlotus; because instead of unfurling outwards, it furls inward into itself. 
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2.2. And from Nonsense into Sense 
To review, we said a name is a complex that enables us to label a notion to have a labeling 
that distinguishes the notion. So in the case of the empty set, at least a characterization 
is possible, such as—repeating the example—“𝑥𝑥 ≠ 𝑥𝑥”. So far, regarding the names for 
the pathological set and the empty one, we can write 
𝓟𝓟 ⇒ (𝓟𝓟,𝓟𝓟,𝓟𝓟)
𝓔𝓔 ⇒ ( 𝜒𝜒(𝓟𝓟), 𝐅𝐅,𝓧𝓧)
where 𝐅𝐅 denotes falsity, and 𝓧𝓧 our primitive object. 
 Any characterization, or an ability to refer, bounds the notion it refers to, by the 
labeling it draws upon it; therefore, it makes some distinction possible; the labeling 
forgets every other property (if there is any) of the notion momentarily, or annihilates 
them permanently. The absolute nothingness is exactly the reference point of this 
labeling; it is where any sort of distinction is impossible; so there is no possible duality, 
and this to say, falsity and truth are not the case. This nothingness does not even have 
a proper name 17  and therefore nothing can break the absolute infinity of its 
indescribable essence. Now that we cannot characterize this notion in a proper way; let 
us take the absolute nothingness and try to pathologically characterize it by a 
mutilation; the label operator being this mutilation, the absolute nothingness can be 
referred to; yet as the absolute nothingness defies being in reference, the outcome of 
this mutilation, the labeling is a falsity; a fundamental flaw; we said something that 
Aristotle said it is, false, namely; we said of, “what it is that it is not”18. 
 The falsity 19  become the possibility for our atom, to be the notion of a 
characterization; the falsity is exactly the thing that prevents this container from 
degenerating out of existence; the definition holds by the means of the falsity, and it 
characterizes a primitive object that can imply a duality; this is to say, a truth can be 
generated, and for such a truth and by the means of the release operator, a falsity can 
be expressed. Fetishistically iterating, reifying, and preserving the singularity of this 
object, decompositions can produce new symbols, and symbols can multiply, and 
varieties can come into being as the singularity oscillates the truth of the primitive 
17 The Ancient Greek had an interesting notion for nothing (or meden) which is “something that in 
principle cannot be” (Žižek, 2012, p. 59), Žižek also describes othing as “not nothing without ‘no,’ not a 
thing”, he further describes how Democritus narrate the transition of this notion into something positive, 
as atoms in the empty space. 
18 See, (Davidson, 1996, p. 265). 
19 In a sense, similar to the idea of a gap, in (Shaw, 2014, p. 511) we have “gaps are by stipulation truth-
values that block inferences like falsehood while having more infectious projection behavior”. Further, in 
(Halmos, 1998, p. 7) Halmos illustrates the Russell paradox most amusingly in a sense that is relative to 
this falsity, saying, “it is impossible, especially in mathematics, to get something for nothing. To specify a 
set, it is not enough to pronounce some magic words . . .  it is necessary also to have at hand a set to whose 
elements the magic words apply”. 
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object; by this equipment; the ability to reference, it is now possible to generate infinite 
varieties, arbitrary objects and an orgiastic universe of all this; revolving around the 
infinite gravity of this singularity; a reference to the unreferable as a locus; the 
projection of the absolute nothingness into a primordial universe, by falsity. 
3. CONCLUSION
We have provided a way to generate an infinite variety, using a primitive object. This 
may be useful as a simple pedagogical instrument to describe primality and integer 
representation of primes, in elementary schools; using amusing visualizations. 
Moreover, I suggest that this idea may be used to generate pseudorandom sequences; 
for example for possible applications in shift registers or similar systems. Further, the 
idea of a variety described in the appendix, may be a suitable subject for further 
investigations. However, what amuses me is the possibility of defining new formal 
systems based on the primitive object described here. As an outrages example, consider 
a formal system that enables us to undertake a uniform logical analysis of different 
categories of human knowledge, such as aesthetics or ethics in one comprehensive 
system. 
APPENDIX 
Nothingness 
Trying to imagine something that is not definable, we say the absolute nothingness is 
such, that nothing can break its state; the invariant of all possible; an absolute infinity 
that can always be the case20, and it cannot even be reduced to the property of being 
referred to21—in a proper way. 
20 Maybe, not far from how Cantor thought about the absolute infinity, “It was Cantor . . . who saw that 
there exists an Absolute Infinity that lies beyond the mathematical transfinites” (Rucker, 2011, pp. 9-13). 
21 In the proper case, if something can refer to this absolute, then there should be something other than 
the absolute, and thus there is something that can break its “always being the case”, as the absolute should 
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Singularities 
To describe our minimal formal system, we need to specify the means, which enables 
this description. As an example, let ℂ be the field of the complex numbers in which the 
following function 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 1/𝑥𝑥 is defined for every element other than 0. Now, the 
point 𝑓𝑓(0) is a division by zero, which is not defined in ℂ; the undefined point, can be 
thought of as something that characterizes the rules of division, which our function 
adopt to generate a certain variety of points. Thus regarding the division, the number 0 is distinguished from every other number of the field, by the properties dictated by 
the quotient. 
 Now for our purposes, we say a singularity is a point within any system which 
removing or identifying it with any other point of the system will result in the total 
collapse, or at least a reduction or a mutilation of the system; as if this was a point, that 
made the characterization of the system in question possible; knot of some sort, that 
unknotting it, gives back a plain meaningless string. For our cause, a singularity, implies 
an important and unique difference of some singular point22, regarding its specific 
system and by means of the implications given by the system. Although, the term 
“singularity” is used in mathematical analysis23 or in modern physics24, and many other 
possible places, now that we mentioned them, we shall safely waive away from them. 
To sum-up—when it is proper—we can think of singularity as the unique 
characterization of a singular point, for which we cannot identify it with any other 
element, further removing the singular point, inevitably redefines the whole system. 
 For intuition, let us briefly investigate a singularity of a literary work. Considering 
one specific work, I suggest, we can look for a singularity, in the loci where the integrity 
of the work oscillates, but it does not fall apart; regarding a theme like love, death, 
be externalized by or from the something, therefore the absolute is not the case in regard to this something; 
thus there exist this thing, which breaks the case of the absolute. For example, in some theological context 
(like Judaism), we have the ineffable name, see (Heschel, 1955, p. 64), or in (Diwane Shams, #1759) we 
can find a seeming conversation of Jalaladdin Balkhi with Spirit; freely translating the ode into English we 
have “you are what I signify; there is no signification in the absolute of my absolute; then you are the…; 
bother not, it is not in language, the, for which I stand”. Finally, in (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 89) we have 
“There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is 
mystical”. 
22 In (Deleuze, 2001, pp. xii, 10, 47-52), point remarquable are points that “distinguish one idea, problem 
or multiplicity from another . . . introduced alongside the mathematical concept of ‘singular point’, which 
is employed to designate those points which characterize or define a given function”. 
23 For example, consider the following, “there may be certain points on the real axis at which the integral 
. . . fails to exist” even though the functions are “integrable on (−∞, +∞)”; the author then refers to such 
points as singularities of the integral and states that these singularities cannot occur unless the functions 
have infinite discontinuities. For details, see (Apostol, 1974, pp. 327-328). 
24 Consider, gravitational singularity, in (Hawking & Penrose, 1970, p. 531) we have, “The gravitational 
constant could, in principle, change sign . . . via a region at which it becomes infinite. Such a region could 
reasonably be called a 'singularity' in any case”. 
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morality, happiness, or whatsoever. We can say the whole structure of the work, is built 
around this loci, and every other element is in an ever-changing state of infinite 
mutations. These loci, these seemingly unresolvable points, somehow force the whole 
story to revolve around their nullity; these omitted points, generate all the meaning and 
characterize the possibilities of the whole work; a singularity, implies a characterization 
by means of an alien-somethings from a transcendental world, that itself is omitted in 
our world. 
Varieties 
In order to understand singularity, we should understand the variety that the singular 
point characterizes. Further, we need to define the idea of an infinite variety. To satisfy 
this two requirements, we need to define further terms; moreover, the resulting 
construction is only intended to satisfy our two requirements, and finally, the 
construction is already cumbersome, thus I shall omit unnecessary details. 
 Whenever we think of a multitude of things, we have already defined a property 
to distinguish these things from each other. This is done by considering a subset of 
every property that can be induced upon these things. One way to do this is to fix some 
property and then refer to some other property; by means of decomposing it into distinct 
referable parts, in a sense, these decomposed parts are attached to the previously fixed 
properties. Alternatively, we can define a symbol from some comprehensive set of 
distinct properties, by referring to one or some of them. 
 We shall call a generator that produces a set (or a variety) of distinct symbols a 
variety generator, denoted by 𝜋𝜋 . Here, as 𝜋𝜋  operates over its argument, which is 
essentially a set of properties; it can omit some of the properties, while preserving some 
other ones; now, from the set of preserved properties, the variety generator decomposes 
some property into further parts using an idea like quotient, and it finds a way to refer 
to each distinct parts of this decomposition. Generally, the variety generator regarding 
some fixed argument, properly, does one or a combination of the following operations 
on the elements of its argument in order to generate a distinct symbol 
o omits some of the properties,
o carries exact copies of some of them,
o decomposes one, or some of them into parts.
Regarding some variety generator, we shall call the rule that generates the distinct 
symbols of the envisioned variety the quantification rule denoted by 𝜓𝜓25, and the 
argument of the variety generator the typeset, denoted by 𝓣𝓣. A typeset, is the set of 
every possible properties that the thing in question can have; or in the other direction, 
the typeset can induce upon the symbols produced by the variety generator. A typeset 
is further equipped with some operation that distinguishes between all of its properties, 
i.e., the typeset implies some expression of its properties. Thus, every property or tip 
25 We distinguish between the variety generator and the quantification rule, to imply an emphasis. 
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𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝓣𝓣 that defines the typeset should itself be distinct and referable; this is to ensure 
that we can validate the accordance of a typeset to the symbols under consideration. 
Now using what we just said and in order to denote the typeset in terms of its tips, we 
can write 𝓣𝓣 ⇒△ 𝑡𝑡 where △, is a procedure on the tips 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝓣𝓣; in simplest case, the 
procedure can be a concatenation of every tip in the typeset. 
 Further, for a typeset 𝓣𝓣 we can have subtypes, 𝓤𝓤 ⊆ 𝓣𝓣 which is itself a typeset, 
such that, 𝓤𝓤 = {𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖} where 𝑖𝑖 is an element of some proper index set 𝑰𝑰. Now as hinted 
earlier, a variety or 𝓥𝓥 is the set of distinct items, such that all of these items are uniquely 
distinguished; each such item is called a symbol. Naturally, we can index these symbols 
by some proper index set, like natural numbers; then we should have a unique index for 
every unique symbol. So far, we said the generator taking on a typeset; produces a 
variety of distinct symbols that represent some possibility induced by the typeset. We 
shall express the whole idea by writing 𝜋𝜋(𝓣𝓣) = 𝓥𝓥. For convince, if we want to refer to 
the rule which produces some specific symbol 𝑥𝑥, we may write 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖(𝜋𝜋) = 𝑥𝑥, where 𝑥𝑥 is 
the 𝑖𝑖 th indexed symbol, and the rule which generates 𝑥𝑥  is in the following form; 
𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖(𝜋𝜋) =△ 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥 where △ is a procedure on the tips 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝓣𝓣. 
 Finally, consider 𝜋𝜋(𝓣𝓣) = 𝓥𝓥; for the specific variety 𝓥𝓥 the relation of the typeset 
to the symbols in the variety; is characterized, most importantly using the following 
special subtypes of the typeset 
o kernel, denoted by 𝐤𝐤𝐤𝐤𝐤𝐤 𝜋𝜋 or 𝜿𝜿, for which every symbol expresses every tip 𝑘𝑘 ∈
𝜿𝜿; and these tips are isolated only by an operator, or between operators, e.g.,
𝑘𝑘 △ 𝑘𝑘′ or △ 𝑘𝑘 △.
o hub, denoted by 𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐡𝐡 𝜋𝜋 or 𝜼𝜼, for which at least one symbol expresses some
parts from a proper decomposition of some tip ℎ ∈  𝜼𝜼 or a mutation of a tip;
which is a tip that the means that differentiates it from other tips or non-
operator elements, is missing, e.g., consider ℎℎ or ℎ𝓣𝓣.
o divergence, denoted by 𝐝𝐝𝐝𝐝𝐝𝐝 𝜋𝜋  or 𝜹𝜹 = {𝑡𝑡 ∶ 𝑡𝑡 ∈ 𝓣𝓣 and 𝑡𝑡 ∉ 𝜿𝜿 ∪ 𝜼𝜼 } , i.e., 𝜹𝜹
represents the set of tips which are completely omitted from every symbol. If
𝜹𝜹 = {}, then we say we have zero divergence.
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 For example, suppose by integers, we mean the semigroup of positive integers. We 
can simply specify a variety by writing 𝜋𝜋(𝓣𝓣) = 𝑵𝑵 or to specify some rule such as 𝜓𝜓1 =1  and 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖>1 = 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖−1 + 1 . This generator somehow represents the totality of the 
semigroup. For using the “integer 1” together with “addition”, and the “ability to refer” 
to a proper previous instance, we can generate the whole variety that is 𝑵𝑵. 
 Now consider another generator 𝜋𝜋(𝓣𝓣) = {𝑥𝑥1,𝑥𝑥2}, where 𝑥𝑥1 = 3 + 7, 𝑥𝑥2 = 5 + 5. 
Here, the quantification “add” some “primes” together to represent the two symbols 
implied by the typeset and generated by 𝜋𝜋 ; yet using different generators further 
varieties with more symbols can be generated. 
Objects 
Very similar to the idea of typeset, we have the notion of an object; which is a system 
of at least two distinct components called atoms, together with some operations, which 
can generate varieties similar to that of the variety generator of a typeset. Moreover, a 
primitive object is an object, consisting of only two atoms. 
 At last, acknowledging the different ways to construct infinite varieties; simply, 
one of them suffices our purpose. Suppose 𝓧𝓧 is a primitive object, regarded as a typeset 
with its tips, being its two distinct atoms; denoted by 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦, and a relation26 between 
the atoms that is implied by 𝓧𝓧; that is to say, the primitive object, has the potentiality 
of producing some specific variety 𝓥𝓥. I propose, 𝓧𝓧 can generate an infinite variety, if 
𝜿𝜿 = {𝑥𝑥}, 𝜼𝜼 = {𝑦𝑦}, and the relation is iterated without termination. 
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